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Can we speak of  virtual natural kinds?
Laurentiu Staicu
University of  Bucharest
My talk today will be about taxonomy and about the way we classify things. More precisely, 
I will discuss, on the one hand, about the way we elaborate our taxonomies in what 
we used to call (despite Plato’s warning), “the real world”, which is the world in which 
we breath and walk, and, on the other hand, in the virtual world of  the Internet. Now, 
usually, taxonomy is a boring subject, it’s all about classes, types, hierarchies and so on. But 
sometimes, we come to realize that as boring as it is, it plays a crucial role in shaping the 
way we see the world around us. This was more obvious than ever with the debate that 
took place last summer (and it’s still going on strong) between the leading astronomers of  
the world concerning the definition of  a planet. That was indeed a very busy and exciting 
summer for astronomers! As we know from the news, on August 24 2006, a session of  
the International Astronomical Union General Assembly in Prague passed a resolution 
re-defining the planets of  our solar system. Only 428 of  the IAU’s nearly 10,000 members 
were involved in the vote, the news says1. The participants proposed a new definition for 
a planet. According to this proposal, a planet is a celestial body which satisfy three main 
conditions: the object must be in orbit around a star, but must not itself  be a star, it must 
have enough mass for the body’s own gravity to pull it into a nearly spherical shape, and 
it must clear its orbit of  other objects. Now, these three conditions are easily satisfied by 
the bigger planets in our solar system, but not as easily by the rest of  them, the smallest 
planets such as Pluto. In fact, according to the voted definition of  a planet, Pluto is no 
longer a planet! So, now there are only eight real planets in our Solar System. But not to 
worry, this is not final! Only a week after the IAU’s decision stripped Pluto of  its status as a 
full-fledged planet of  the Solar System, some “rebel” astronomers started a campaign with 
the objective of  restoring Pluto’s planetary status. They wrote a petition which was already 
signed by more than 300 professional researchers and which attacks the IAU’s decision. 
Their protest can be read on the Web. One of  the petition supporters said that the number 
of  those who voted in Prague is not enough for such an important decision. The IAU 
assigned Pluto and other large objects to a new category - “dwarf  planet.” 
1  For some details about the meeting see, for example, the following: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/
hi/in_depth/5282440.stm
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 So, the astronomical taxonomy has changed suddenly, by voting. As I said, the debate 
is not over yet, maybe the “rebels” will succeed to restore the planetary status to Pluto, 
maybe they won’t. But that’s not the issue I want to discuss now. I brought this example 
into discussion because I think it shows us very well two things: first, how fragile can be 
sometimes the scientific taxonomy and, for that matter, any other taxonomy, and secondly, 
what a decisive role it plays in shaping our images of  the world around us. 
 Now, in talking about scientific taxonomy we are also talking, implicitly, about natural 
kinds. And that’s because more often than not scientific taxonomies comprises natural 
kinds of  events, substances, particles or things. In the last decades, the debate over the 
status of  natural kinds gained a significant impetus in the philosophical circles. The reason 
is quite simple: natural kinds play a key role in the network of  scientific explanations. 
After all, scientific generalizations and laws are not about individual things directly, they 
are about kinds of  things that we find in nature, they are about natural kinds of  things. 
But then the question arise: what is a natural kind? This question received many answers. 
I won’t follow the details of  these answers because this is not what I intend to discuss, 
but I will sketch a brief  taxonomy of  the most important answers offered. In a first wave 
of  the debate, the answers oscillated between a radical nominalism (natural kinds are just 
conventional classes which are made according to our epistemic and practical interests) and 
a radical realism (natural kinds are natural classes of  things which we find as such in nature). 
Thereafter, the positions taken in the debate over the status of  natural kinds became more 
gradate and, as it always happens in such difficult cases, some more reasonable answers 
have been formulated. One of  the most reasonable of  these maintained that natural kinds 
are dependent upon the natural properties of  things, properties which exists as such in 
nature, but are well-chosen by us according to our epistemic or practical interests. In this 
respect, a very interesting case, which revived the debate over the status of  natural kinds is 
that of  biological species. The theory of  evolution, maybe the most important biological 
theory, as it is considered by many biologists and philosophers of  biology, is about species. 
But, again, the question arise: what is a biological species? Is it a natural kind in the realistic 
sense?2 Or is it a class of  individuals which we put together in a certain way according to our 
explanatory interests? Well, the debate is not over and, probably, won’t be over soon. The 
case of  Pluto, which I brought into discussion earlier, probably will give a new stimulus to 
this debate over the ontological status of  natural kinds. Now, as I see it, the main difficulty 
in this debate is not attached to the term “kind”. This is not a questionable term. We 
could all agree that the term “kind” means “class” or “type”, etc. The difficulty arises once 
we ask what do we mean by “natural”. For the common individual, which is unaware of  
philosophical sophistry and arguments, “natural” means what is out there, in nature, what 
2  For a clear exposition of the debate over the relation between biological species and natural 
kinds see the monumental work of Alexander Rosenberg, The Structure of Biological Science, Cam-
bridge University Press, 1985, 185-225. 
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exists independently of  us, humans3. On the other part, for those who read Kant at least, 
“natural” could no longer have this meaning, “natural” is only that which gets through the 
filter of  our sensibility or our senses. In other words, “natural” is only that which we can 
perceive. Further more, for those who also read Wittgenstein, “natural” means that which 
bear, in a way or another, the mark of  our language or, more precisely, that which enter 
between the boundaries of  our language: a natural kind is a class of  individuals which could 
be talked about in language, to which we could give a name and a definition4. There are, of  
course, those who also read beyond Wittgenstein, for which “natural” means that which is 
built up and configured according to our cultural norms, or the opinions of  the elites from 
a certain epoch and so on. What I want to say with this is that today, the word “natural” 
has no longer a clear meaning, at least in the philosophical circles. Once we abandoned 
the characteristic belief  of  the robust metaphysical realism, according to which things and 
entities in nature have real essences, which could be discovered by us during the cumulative 
process of  scientific research, we have big problems in finding something which allow us 
to speak of  “natural” in the sense of  “unaffected by humans”.  And so, it seems all we can 
do is to accept that unavoidable relativism and to abandon the sophisticated debates over 
the ontological status of  entities such as natural kinds, events, properties, causal powers 
and so on. In the case of  natural kinds, for example, from the relativistic point of  view, 
if  our explanatory interests and, of  course, practical interests, require us to speak about 
the class of  mammals as being a natural kind, we can do this without asking ourselves if  
mammals are really a natural kind or not.  Maybe tomorrow we will change our attitude 
and we will abandon the natural kind of  mammals, again, if  our interests will require this 
or if  the members of  the biological science’s elite will reach a consensus in that direction. 
It seems to me that this position finds itself  a very well-articulated expression in Richard 
Rorty’s writings, and this is perhaps one of  the reasons for which Rorty is loved and hated 
by some many people in the same time5. 
 But even if  this relativism might seem very appealing (first of  all, if  we embrace it we 
could get rid in a single move, of  so many philosophical nightmares!), I think we cannot 
afford to adopt it as such. In this respect, the case of  the definition of  a planet comes 
again on stage. Can we continue to consider Pluto a planet because we used to do that 
for quite a time now? Or because the camp of  those who maintain that it is a planet is 
3  This position is often called “naïve realism” a label which, although without intention, makes 
a huge injustice to the long tradition of metaphysical realism which is associated with it. The arguments 
for metaphysical realism may be wrong, but not naïve, in any sense of the word.  
4  For an interesting perspective on Wittgenstein’s perspective concerning the world’s substra-
tum, see Ian Proops, ‘Wittgenstein on the Substance of the World’, European Journal of Philosophy, 12, 
1, 2004, 106-126.
5  For a very clear and concise exposition of Rorty’s position concerning the realism/relativism 
debate see, for example, Richard Rorty, ‘Putnam and the relativist Menace’, The Journal of Philosophy, 
Vol. XC, 9, 443-461. 
Ontology Studies 8, 2008  156
bigger than the camp of  their opponents? And inversely, can we accept not to consider it 
a planet because 428 astronomers decided during an official meeting that it is not a planet? 
I think the answer is no in both cases. And so, what can we do or, more precisely, how 
are we supposed to put an end to this debate over the status of  Pluto or any other similar 
taxonomical debate? We need a basis, a natural ground for anchoring the definition which 
concern us, be it the definition of  a planet or of  something else. And so, we get back to 
the meaning of  the term “natural”. But, as I said earlier, it is very difficult to give a precise 
meaning to this term. I suppose that anyone who followed quite a bit the debate over 
the status of  natural kinds from the last decades or so could say clearly enough that the 
stake in this debate is precisely the meaning of  the term “natural” and the assignation of  
an invariant definition to it. And that’s because, even if  we could no longer speak of  the 
“natural” in the sense of  that which can be found out there, unaffected by us, it is equally 
impossible to accept that “natural” means whatever we want it to mean, or whatever the 
cultural or scientifical elites elects it to mean or whatever serves better our present interests 
and goals. No, we want to reach a definition which could avoid, on the one hand, the 
commitments to our (human) point of  view, and on the other hand to avoid the claim of  
miraculously surpassing this point of  view through a direct perception of  what could be 
found out there, in nature, without reference to our point of  view. But how can we do 
this? Well, I really don’t know the answer to this question ! But in the following I will try 
to show that we could find new ways of  searching a reasonable answer to this question by 
simply comparing, from the point of  view of  taxonomy, the two worlds above-mentioned: 
the real world around us, and the virtual world of  the Internet. 
 I would like to start this comparison by asking what do we mean by “natural” in regard 
to what could be called “the brave new world of  the Internet” that world in which we all 
live or, to put it mildly, to which we all participate, willingly or not, for quite a time now? 
More precisely, how do we discern between natural and artificial or conventional, etc., in 
this new cave which is the Internet? Obviously, an old-fashioned realist would say that 
this question is plainly absurd or, more politely, that it is a question which does not arise 
because the Internet is completely a virtual world which means artificial. It is just a human 
construction, a complicated sequence of  1’s and 0’s, nothing natural. But then he would 
have to define what’s “natural” and, as I said before, there seems to be no simple definition 
for this term. After all, for all we know, it could be that the nature around us or the “real 
world” is nothing more than a complicated sequence of  elementary particles which we 
cannot observe directly not even with the most sophisticated apparatus6. Now, leaving 
aside the reductionist question of the ultimate bricks from which the real world or the 
virtual world of the Internet are constructed and the analogy between them, the old-
fashioned realist could continue by saying that the difference between the real world 
6  A good (and entertaining!) introduction to the ‘bestiary’ of subatomic particles is John Grib-
bin’s book In Search of SUSY, Supersymmetry and the Theory of Everything, Penguin Books, 1998.  
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of Nature and the virtual world of the Internet lies in the fact that we cannot perceive 
things on the Internet as we perceive things in the real world. And he would be right, 
of course. We cannot touch the sword masterfully handled by a the character from an 
online game which we play on the Internet, we can only see it on the screen. But there 
are many things in the so-called real world that we cannot touch, for example we cannot 
touch the Pole Star, we can only see it. Yes, the realist would say, but in the case of 
the Internet we know that those things we cannot touch but only see are made by us, a 
clever programmer made a certain sequence of 1’s and 0’s which in our eyes appears 
as a shinny sword in the hand of a legendary hero. But the Polar Star was not made by 
us, even if we can observe it only through the lens of a telescope without being able 
to touch it. This is again true. But it is not sufficient: an optical illusion, for example, 
is not something made by us, and despite that, it is something artificial, at least in the 
sense that it is not what it appears to be. And the rabbit hole goes deeper and deeper, 
to borrow an expression of Morpheus, the famous character from the equally famous 
movie The Matrix. In other words, this imaginary discussion with an equally imaginary 
realist could continue.
 But I won’t continue it because I believe that the realist just said something very 
interesting for what I want to maintain in the following. He said that the virtual world of 
the Internet is a world made by us. More important still is the fact that it was created by 
us to serve certain goals and objectives. And these goals and objectives are highlighted 
precisely by the way in which we constructed the virtual taxonomies which populate the 
Internet and by the way in which these taxonomies are evolving in time, in proportion as 
the Internet is growing and acquire new levels. Now, as anyone knows, at least anyone 
who navigated on the Internet at least once, the Internet is inhabited by many things: 
sites, blogs, portals, virtual organizations, virtual shops, images, texts, maps, games, 
etc. All these entities are forming together a network, very similar with the network 
which compounds the real world, even if it is much, much poorer than this one. But 
from the point of view of taxonomy, the difference is just a difference in grade. New 
types of virtual entities are appearing every year, in proportion as our needs of virtual 
representation, of communication and of storing information are growing, on the one 
hand, and on the other hand the programming capacity of computers expands. But how 
are assorted and classified all these different types of entities? The search engines, for 
example, offers a pre-established scheme for searching: the Yahoo search engine, for 
example, offers a pre-established classification for our searches after cars, finances, 
games, groups, maps, jobs, sports, images, news, and so on. If I write my name in 
the search box and I hit the search button for images, I will probably find images of 
myself or photographs made by me and displayed on the Internet. If I write my name 
and I hit the search button for news, most likely I won’t find any entries because I 
don’t remember doing something as important as to be displayed in the Yahoo news 
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category! And again, if I write my name and I hit the search button for groups, most 
likely I will find the discussions groups to which I subscribed. These pre-established 
categories channels the search in a certain direction. That’s why it’s very important to 
know precisely in which category falls what are we looking for because, as the Internet 
fans are saying, you can find anything on the web as long as you know where and how 
to search. But are these categories artificially formulated or defined? In other words, are 
the virtual taxonomies which configures the Internet conventionally made, following 
our epistemic and practical interests? I think the answer is in the same time yes and no. 
It’s clear enough that these categories are defined in such a way as to respond to our 
needs, which is to facilitate our searching on the web: if you are interested by images, 
it’s much more easier to search in a category which contains only images.  Because the 
Internet was created, as I said earlier, for certain purposes. It is a user-centered world, 
more precisely a world centered on the user’s interests, goals, and perspectives. For 
example, one of the main functions of the Internet is that of offering a very fast and easy 
to use way of searching information. That’s why all the search engines are competing 
with each other trying to offer more analytical and more flexible taxonomies every 
year, to facilitate our searches. And this is a very a tough competition! Now, given this 
goal of searching after relevant information, and given the diversity of the information 
which could be of interest for the users, it is reasonable (which means natural) to have 
a separate category for news and a separate category for cars or matrimonials, although 
the advertisements for selling cars could be also considered in a way, news. It would 
be unreasonable (which means unnatural) to find matrimonials in the news category! 
Furthermore, the virtual taxonomies are evolving together with the virtual world which 
they organize. When the users’ interests are getting more and more sophisticated, 
crossing taxonomies are appearing, you can search for news with or without images, 
you can search for matrimonials with or without images (without images would be, of 
course, unwise!) and so on. All these taxonomies, which evolves according to the users’ 
interests, are trying to be as natural as they could be. But in which sense do we use the 
word natural here? This question could arouse, of course, very deep suspicions and 
resistances and could make us to raise our eyebrow in distrust because it seems very 
odd to speak of something natural in the virtual world of the Internet. But if we rephrase 
the question the suspicions could diminish. We could ask, for example the following: 
is it natural to distinguish, in the categories displayed by a search engine, between 
news and matrimonials? I think the answer is yes. Because the information which we 
could find in the news category are of a different nature than the information which we 
could find in the matrimonials category. So we can consider that these two categories 
are making two separate natural kinds. Of course, virtual natural kinds. Now we can 
ask who decides this or, more precisely, which is the criterion according to which we 
establish the border between these two categories or, as I dared to baptize them, these 
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two virtual natural kinds? I think the answer is clear enough: the criterion is given 
by the interests of the users. These interests are, of course, subjective, they fluctuate, 
they change and vary in time but they give birth to some natural classifications which 
fluctuate accordingly. It is clear that these virtual natural kinds are not natural kinds in 
any realistic sense. Because the interests of the users cannot be considered properly 
real essences which could give birth to some natural kinds as an old-fashioned realist 
would want. The virtual classifications are strongly attached to the interests of the users. 
If these interests are changing, so are the virtual classifications, the categories of the 
virtual world of the Internet. There is nothing stable once and for all here, this is why 
I said that the interests of the users are not real essences and accordingly the virtual 
taxonomies which try to satisfy these interests are not virtual natural kinds in the way a 
realist would want them to be. Nonetheless, this is not something to be worried about. 
As I said at the beginning of this talk, as long as we no longer have too many reasons to 
believe that we will be able at some point to find such real essences not even in the real 
world, we have less reasons to believe this when we talk about a virtual world as the 
Internet. But despite all these, in this virtual world we still need to distinguish between 
natural and artificial. And we do this by formulating virtual natural kinds. They aren’t 
natural in the sense that they are not affected by human intervention because they are in 
fact constructed by us. But this aspect is irrelevant now. In a world artificially created, 
which means a world without real essences, there is no use in talking about something 
unaffected by human intervention. 
 With this conclusion in mind, let’s go back to what we call the real world. In contrast 
with the virtual world of  the Internet, the real world is not constructed according to our 
interests or the interests of  the user. Although this perspective was indeed maintained 
times and often, I think it is too selfish to be endorsed. Now, if  we keep this analogy 
with the Internet, we must say that in the real world, in contrast with the virtual world in 
which we entered recently with the advance of  computers technology, there isn’t just one 
type of  user, but many types. The Internet is used only by humans, but the real world is 
used, so to speak, by many other types of  users. If  by users we understand living beings, 
which interacts with the environment around them, and which follow their own goals 
and purposes, then we can say that the real world comprises a big variety of  users. There 
are humans, of  course, but there are felines, birds, fish, insects and so on. And all these 
users have their own specific interests. We don’t have too many reasons to believe that in 
this entanglement of  specific interests and types of  users, the interests of  a single type of  
user are prevailing, namely the human type. So we cannot pretend that our taxonomies 
are the real ones.  But neither could we relax with the conclusion that we can formulate 
whatever taxonomies we want or serve for the best to our present interests and believe 
that they are the real ones. Because, as I said, in the real world there isn’t only one type 
of  user and one set of  interests, as in the case of  the Internet. From this point of  view, 
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the Internet is a simple and wonderful world: it is a virtual network in which humans are 
interacting with one another and follow their own goals and purposes, individually or 
collectively. But those who interact are only humans. Their interests are entering, broadly, 
in the same categories, so the virtual taxonomies are relatively easy to construct. As I said 
earlier, on the Internet it is natural to distinguish between matrimonials and news. We 
don’t have to bother much with subtle details and questions. But in the real world, we 
interact with many other types of  users which have their own specific interests. And which 
see the world through specific lenses according to their interests. Even if  the taxonomies 
which they use for seeing the world around them are not constructed consciously or 
reflectively as ours, they still see the world through the lenses of  their own classifications. 
And their taxonomies or classifications are changing in time also, as ours. Probably, for the 
prehistorical felines the first humans were a dangerous kind, which should be avoided as a 
threat. But in time, after the humans domesticate them, the situation has changed. Our cats 
are no longer avoiding us, but on the contrary. Today we started to realize that in the real 
world there are many different categories of  users, which have their own specific interests 
and which see the world according to these interests. But for a long period of  time we 
ignored this aspect. We made our own classifications, we divided the world in natural kinds 
according to our own interests and we also found some justifications for acting this selfish. 
The humans are the only knowing subject, we used to say and we are still saying, the only 
being gifted by God with the right to rule the world, etc. But the result of  this attitude 
was catastrophic. And this is in no way a surprise. If  we see the animals which inhabits the 
natural world around us as being part only of  such categories as “predators”, “eatable” or 
“uneatable”, “harmless”, and so on, it’s obvious that in a long period of  time we will play 
a decisive role in the extinction of  numerous species of  animals or we’ll determine major 
perturbations of  the natural equilibrium. This is just another example of  how important 
are the taxonomies which we construct, not only for the way we see the world around us, 
but also for the way we come to act in it. 
 So, we could say that for a long time we constructed the taxonomies for the real world 
as we construct now the taxonomies for the Internet, which is mainly according to our 
interests. In the case of  virtual taxonomies, which are shaping the virtual world of  the 
Internet this is something natural, useful and efficient. We are the only users and the virtual 
natural kinds in which we divide this virtual world are answering very well to our needs and 
interests of  communication. But in the real world this strategy is not as good or, at least, 
gives birth to many difficulties. We cannot ignore the fact that in the real world we are not 
the only users! So, in this case, what can we do?
 Well, for the start, maybe it would be wise to put aside the search for a definition for 
the natural kinds in the stronger realistic sense, and try to do with just a definition for what 
could be called the human natural kinds. Then we could start to pay more attention to the 
natural kinds in which divide the world the other living beings around us, the other users 
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which inhabit this network which we used to call “the real world”. And, finally, maybe 
it would be wise to search the intersections of  these different taxonomies. Because it is 
possible that these intersections could give us the invariant definition which we search and 
need for the  term “natural”. In other words, these three steps briefly sketched here could 
be compressed to a single one huge leap: to abandon the search for real essences for good, 
both in the philosophical realm, where we done that directly for so many centuries, and 
in the realm of  natural science, where we search for the ultimate bricks of  the Universe 
which is, I think, just a disguised name for the old philosophical search for real essences. 
And rather to search after the common denominators, the intersections of  the taxonomies 
used by the users which inhabit the real world. 
 After all, as Plato would probably tell us, real essences cannot be find in this world, 
in the cave. But despite this warning, we still live in this world and we need to divide it in 
natural kinds or classes of  things to be able to manage and reach our goals and purposes, 
or to be able to survive as a species, as Darwin would put it. In many ways, this world is 
a different world that the virtual world of  the Internet, this new cave that we constructed 
ourselves, a cave where, as I said, there is only one single type or kind of  user. As long as 
the cats, for example, doesn’t navigate on the Internet, we can be assured that the Internet 
is populated indeed by those virtual natural kinds that are answering the best to our needs 
and interests and that these kinds are well established. In other ways, the real world is not 
so different from the virtual one. Because, even if  in the real world there are many types 
or kinds of  users, all these users are dividing the world around them, consciously or just 
instinctively, in classes and natural kinds according to their interests. And these interests 
cannot be classified according to a unique scale. We cannot give them different values 
according to an ideal classification in which human interests are at the top. We cannot 
believe anymore in a world of  ideas which could give us the model for classifying the 
things around us. And in this respect we have to say Plato farewell. 
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